Weight is conceptualized as an embodiment of importance, according to recent research on embodied cognition (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010; Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009) . Is importance as embodied by weight used as a cue that items are memorable? Four experiments varied participants' perceptual experiences of weight as they studied words and predicted later memory performance via judgments of learning (JOLs) for a recall (Experiment 1) or recognition (Experiments 2-4) memory test. Greater weight was associated with higher JOLs, although weight did not affect actual memory performance. The relationship between weight and JOLs disappeared when participants were primed to think of cases where lightweight is a positive attribute and heavyweight is a negative attribute (Experiment 4). Even cognition about our own cognition is embodied.
Embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are rooted in and shaped by the body and its interactions with the environment during perception and action (for a review, see Glenberg, 2010) . For example, language comprehension involves a simulation of perceptual qualities and actions (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) , and memories incorporate particular aspects of perceptual and motoric experience (Brunel, Labeye, Lesourd, & Versace, 2009; Dijkstra, Kaschak, & Zwaan, 2007) . The embodied nature of cognition is revealed when memory, judgment, or comprehension is affected by current sensorimotor experiences. So, for example, holding a heavier rather than a lighter clipboard while being asked to judge the importance of various issues increases judged importance (Ackerman et al., 2010; Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009) , suggesting that the concept of importance either is metaphorically linked to weightiness or contains a simulation of lifting a weight (see also Chandler, Reinhard, & Schwarz, 2012; Schneider, Rutjens, Jostmann, & Lakens, 2011) . However, there may be boundary conditions on the degree to which cognition is affected by current sensorimotor experiences. The current research asks whether embodied effects extend to metacognitive judgments.
Metacognition is the monitoring and control of cognitive processes such as memory, comprehension, and problem solving.
Because metacognition is cognition about cognition, it could be considered more removed from perception and action than are other domains where embodied cognition has been demonstrated. Indeed, one of the boundary conditions of embodied cognition is whether people are induced to think more abstractly. Maglio and Trope (2012) manipulated whether people took a more abstract and high-level versus a more concrete and low-level construal of the object of judgment in a pair of studies assessing embodied effects in judgment. When participants were led to adopt a more abstract construal, embodied cognition effects did not occur: The weight of a backpack worn by participants did not affect their judgments of the length of a hallway, and the weight of a clipboard held by participants did not affect their judgments of the importance of an issue. In contrast, when participants were led to adopt a more concrete construal, the heavier backpack increased judged distance (Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003) and the heavier clipboard increased judged importance (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010; Jostmann et al., 2009) .
However, research on metacognition, particularly research on metamemory, indicates that metacognitive judgments are not necessarily abstract in that they incorporate experiential cues. Castel (2008, 2009 ) demonstrated that when people are asked to predict the likelihood of remembering a word on a future memory test, they use the ease of perceiving the memory item as a basis for their judgments of learning (JOLs). Words appearing in a large font were judged as more memorable than were words appearing in a small font (Rhodes & Castel, 2008) , and words presented more loudly were judged more memorable than were words presented more softly (Rhodes & Castel, 2009) . People also use the experience of difficulty of encoding as an indication of the memorability of an item, such that items that are more difficult to encode are judged as less memorable (Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006) . One embodied manipulation of effort is to require people to contract their eyebrows toward the center of the forehead (Niedenthal, 2007; Strack & Neumann, 2000) . Koriat and Nussinson (2009) found that such a manipulation of perceived effort during attempts to memorize led participants to give lower JOLs to to-be-remembered items.
We conducted four experiments to test whether metamemory judgments are affected by sensorimotor experiences of weight during study of items. Weight is an embodiment of importance in that weight selectively increases judgments of importance and seriousness but not judgments in general (Ackerman et al., 2010; Jostmann et al., 2009 ). However, weight may influence judgments of learning because people believe that important events are more memorable. In a norming study, Libkuman, Otani, Kern, Viger, and Novak (2007) found a strong (.77) correlation between rated importance and rated memorability of photographs from the International Affective Picture System. Rhodes and Castel (2008) noted that large font size could have indicated importance that in turn increased JOLs. Indeed, manipulations of value via the experimental assignment of higher points for recall of some items increases JOLs (Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011), and Castel (2007) defined value as "the importance or weight [emphasis added] that is assigned to information" (p. 232). Therefore, we predicted that participants' perceptual experience of weight would increase their metacognitive judgments of learning.
Weight could also affect learning if weighty objects draw more attention and so induce better encoding. However, given that we controlled study time in these experiments, we expected such variations in attention to be negligible relative to deliberate attempts to study items (cf. Rhodes & Castel, 2009) , and so we predicted that weight would not affect memory performance.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, participants made judgments of learning (JOLs) as they memorized a list of words for a later recall test. For the first half of the study phase, participants wrote their JOLs on a form attached to either a light or a heavy clipboard, and in the second half of the study phase they wrote their JOLs on a form attached to the other-weighted clipboard. In line with the notion of weight as an embodiment of importance, we predicted that words studied while holding the heavy clipboard would receive higher JOLs.
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight Florida State University undergraduates were recruited via web advertisements and participated for psychology course credit. Clipboard weight was manipulated within subjects, and clipboard order was counterbalanced. One participant was excluded from analysis due to a failure to follow instructions.
Materials. Words for the study consisted of 52 nouns taken from the Rubin and Friendly (1986) norms, randomly divided into two lists of 20 items, with the remaining words used as six primacy and six recency buffers that were excluded from analysis. The critical lists were equated for probability of recall using Rubin and Friendly's norms. Word sets were also equated for average JOL when studied by pilot participants (n ϭ 15) as words presented on a list: JOLs averaged 48.5 on a 100-point scale and did not differ between lists, F(1, 14) Ͻ 1.
One light (0.50 lb [0.23 kg] ) and one heavy (1.24 lb [0.56 kg]) clipboard were used to hold a form that participants used to make their JOL ratings on a scale ranging from 0 (I definitely won't recall the word) to 100 (I'll certainly recall the word). To-berecalled words and the cue to give a 0 -100 JOL rating were presented in 40-pt font using a computer running E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools). For the free recall test, participants typed responses into a form in Microsoft Excel.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually. After giving informed consent, participants were told that one purpose of the study was to examine how different bodily states affect memory for words (see Jostmann et al., 2009 ); thus, the procedure called for completing the first task in a standing position approximately 4 ft (1.22 m) from the computer screen. Participants were asked to study 52 words for a recall memory test to be given after the study phase and were told that words would be presented individually for 5 s, followed by a cue to write on the JOL confidence form an estimate of the probability of recall from 0 to 100. After each JOL was recorded, the experimenter pressed a button to present the next word for study.
Participants began by studying each word and recording its JOL on a memory confidence form secured to a light or heavy clipboard (counterbalanced across participants). The font size and organization of the numbering on the form were sufficiently large to allow only half (26) of the JOLs to be recorded on the form, which offered a reasonable cover for switching clipboards between lists. After Trial 26, the words Next Page appeared on the screen to indicate the need for a new form, which was promptly offered by the experimenter (the new form was attached to the differentweight clipboard). After a brief filler task (listing cities/states), participants were allowed 4 min to recall studied items by typing them into a computer file.
After finishing the recall test, participants were interviewed to determine if they were aware of variations in the clipboard weight. Jostmann et al. (2009) found an effect of weight on judged importance in the absence of conscious awareness of weight variations. Awareness of manipulations sometimes changes interpretations of perceptual experience (e.g., see Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990) . Participants answered three questions of graded directness (cf. Whittlesea, 1993) : "How did you decide your confidence level for each item?" "Was it more difficult to decide your confidence level on some items than others? (If so, what caused the difficulty?)," and "Did standing-or any other aspects of the task-seem to affect your confidence during study from trial to trial?" No participants expressed awareness of the weight manipulation or suspicions about the clipboards. Participants were then debriefed and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that JOLs were higher for words studied while participants were holding the heavy clipboard, F(1, 26) ϭ 4.6, p ϭ .042, MSE ϭ 79.2, p 2 ϭ .15 (see Figure 1 ). Actual recall memory performance did not vary as a function of clipboard weight, F(1, 26) ϭ 1.3, p ϭ .27, MSE ϭ 0.007, p 2 ϭ .05, and the numerical difference (light ϭ .18, heavy ϭ .15) was in the opposite direction from that of the JOLs.
1 We interpret the weight-JOL relationship in terms of the idea that importance as embodied by weight may be used as a cue that items are memorable. Absence of an actual memory performance difference converges with a number of results where metamemory judgments are affected by cues in the absence of an effect on the criterion measure (cf. Rhodes & Castel, 2009; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010) .
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we extended our findings in two ways. First, rather than varying weight in a blocked fashion as in Experiment 1, we varied weight on a trial-by-trial basis by affixing typed words to the underside of weighted pillow boxes that participants had to pick up to read. Prior work on the effects of weight on judgment has used blocked procedures (and a small number of judgments), and some research has found that embodied manipulations such as facial muscle contraction affect cognition only during blocked presentations (Strack & Neumann, 2000) . However, weight of small objects can be quickly assessed in the world, so we predicted that even trial-by-trial variations in weight could influence metacognitive judgments.
Experiment 1 found that weight affected judgments of learning but not actual memory performance. However, recall performance was relatively low; so in Experiment 2 we shifted to a potentially more sensitive recognition memory test, which allowed us to further examine whether weight affects memory performance, perhaps via greater attention to weightier items.
Method
Participants. Twenty-five Florida State University undergraduates were recruited via web advertisements and participated for psychology course credit. Pillow box weight was manipulated within subjects. One participant was excluded from analysis for estimating 100% confidence on every trial.
Materials. Words consisted of 92 nouns drawn from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) . Half of these words were used as new items on the recognition memory test. The other half were divided into two lists of 23 nouns, matched for concreteness and frequency (Kučera & Francis, 1967) .
Each study word was printed on an individual label and affixed to a pillow box that was 3.5 ϫ 2.5 ϫ 1 in. (8.9 ϫ 6.4 ϫ 2.5 cm; see Figure 2a ). Light (0.32 oz [9.07 g]) and heavy (0.44 oz [12.47 g]) pillow boxes were created by wrapping either a 0.13-oz (3.69-g) or a 0.25-oz (7.09-g) weight in tissue paper and stuffing it inside the pillow box. Assignment of study word lists to weight condition was counterbalanced across participants. A number was affixed to each pillow box on the side opposite the word so that participants could match the number to a JOL prediction form numbered from 1 to 46.
Procedure. Participants responded to an advertisement for a study of how perceptual experiences affect memory and were tested in small groups. The full set of pillow boxes was lined up on tables arranged in a square (see Figure 2b ). Participants were informed they were to study words for a recognition memory test to be given after the study phase and that the study phase involved interacting with items instead of merely sitting at a computer (see Appendix for the exact wording). Judgments of learning were explained, and participants were given a form to record their judgments of learning, using a 0 -100 scale as in Experiment 1. The form contained 46 numbered boxes to map onto the 46 numbered words on the pillow boxes.
A research assistant signaled the beginning and end of each 5-s study trial by announcing "start" and "stop." At the start signal, participants were to pick up a pillow box and begin studying the affixed word. When they heard "stop," participants were to put down the pillow box and record their estimate of the probability of recognition on the provided memory confidence form. Participants were monitored to see that they complied by holding the pillow box for the entire study trial. After recording their judgment of learning on a trial, participants were to step over to the next pillow box and wait for the next start signal. Participants were told to circle the number corresponding to their first pillow box, which we used to eliminate the first and last three items as primacy and recency buffers, respectively.
After the study phase, participants were seated and allowed 3 min for the yes/no recognition test, which was presented on a single page. Participants were then asked to turn over the recognition test and write whether any factors, including standing or interacting with items, seemed to affect their ability to memorize the words. Only one participant remarked that the weight of the pillow boxes varied. Results were the same with or without this participant, so we included his data.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, JOLs were higher for words affixed to the heavy pillow boxes, F(1, 23) ϭ 6.07, p ϭ .02, MSE ϭ 19.2, p 2 ϭ .21 (see Figure 1) . Weight served as a cue for metacognitive judgments 1 Weight had no effect on actual memory performance in any of the experiments, aside from a marginally significant result in Experiment 4. Because weight is a nondiagnostic cue for JOLs, using it as a cue for JOLs likely impairs resolution or relative accuracy of JOLs. However, we did not calculate measures of relative accuracy because we did not include comparison groups where weight did not vary. even when it varied on a trial-by-trial basis. Moreover, Experiment 2 extended the finding of perceptually driven metacognitive judgments to preparation for a recognition memory test. As in Experiment 1, actual recognition memory performance as measured by hits (.91 vs. .90) minus false alarms (.05 vs. .05) was unaffected by the weight manipulation (F Ͻ 1).
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to manipulate weight subtly, in case the embodied effect of weight on judgment relies on a lack of awareness of the weight manipulation. For example, weight may be interpreted as importance when variations go unnoticed but may be attributed to the clearly irrelevant manipulation of pillow box weight and so discounted as a basis for JOLs when the weight variations are noticed. Experiment 3 questioned this assumption by using a more extreme manipulation of weight that produced noticeable weight differences across study trials.
Method
Participants. Twenty-six Florida State University undergraduates were recruited via web advertisements and participated for psychology course credit. Pillow box weight was manipulated within subjects.
Materials and procedure.
Materials were identical to those in Experiment 2, except that extra weight was added to create a clearly noticeable difference between the light (0.44 oz [12.47 g]) and the heavy (2.20 oz [62.37 g]) pillow boxes. Assignment of subsets of words to weight condition was counterbalanced across participants. The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 2, except that participants were openly informed that one factor they would notice about the pillow boxes is that they varied by weight (see Appendix; see Rhodes & Castel, 2008) .
Results and Discussion
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that JOLs varied as a function of pillow box weight, with higher JOLs assigned to words affixed to the heavy pillow boxes, F(1, 25) ϭ 8.13, p ϭ .01, MSE ϭ 29.5, p 2 ϭ .25 (see Figure 1) . The weight differences across trials were clearly noticeable, and participants were informed that the weight of the boxes varied, yet weight nonetheless served as a cue for metacognition.
As predicted, weight did not affect recognition memory performance as measured by hits (.89 vs. .91) minus false alarms (.04 vs. .04; F Ͻ 1). Weight variations created an illusion that items would be memorable (cf. Rhodes & Castel, 2008 ; see also Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007) .
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4, we sought to eliminate the relationship between the perceptual experience of weight and JOLs by priming a different interpretation of weight: The priming manipulation explicitly equated "lightweight" with new and improved and "heavyweight" with old and outdated. Priming these concepts was meant to alter the interpretation of the weight of studied items such that lighter items would be interpreted as good and heavier items as bad. Because people make higher JOLs to words with positive or negative valence compared with neutral (Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010) , the priming manipulation should lead to equivalent JOLs across weights. Priming valence in this way should nullify the idea that weight signifies importance, leading to a null effect of weight in the valence prime condition of this experiment.
Method
Participants. Forty-seven Florida State University undergraduates were recruited via web advertisements and participated for psychology course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to the control (no prime) condition or the valence prime condition. Pillow box weight was manipulated within subjects.
Materials and procedure. Materials were identical to those in Experiment 3, except that we added an additional 4 oz (113.4 g) to the heavy pillow boxes, magnifying the weight difference between the light (0.44 oz [12.47 g]) and the heavy (6.20 oz [175.77 g]) pillow boxes. For the no-prime condition, the procedure was identical to that in Experiment 3. For the valence prime condition, we primed the idea that lightweight objects are often new and improved and heavyweight objects are associated with out-of-date items (see Appendix). 
Results and Discussion
As shown in Figure 3 , in the control (no prime) condition, we replicated the effects of pillow box weight on JOLs, with higher JOLs assigned to words affixed to the heavy pillow boxes, F(1, 24) ϭ 6.92, p ϭ .015, MSE ϭ 26.2, p 2 ϭ .22. In contrast, for the valence prime condition, JOLs did not vary as a function of pillow box weight (F Ͻ 1). Thus, we eliminated the effect of weight on JOLs by priming the idea that lightweight is a positive attribute and heavyweight is a negative attribute. In a separate experiment, we replicated the elimination of the weight-JOL relationship using simply the "lightweight is good" prime-that is, without hefting the bulky laptop and emphasizing that heavyweight is bad, F(1, 28) 2 ϭ .04. The marginally significant relationship between weight and recognition memory in the control (no prime) condition suggests that when the discrepancy between lighter and heavier boxes is large enough, and the weight of the heavier box is large enough, heavyweight items may receive more attention or better encoding, and the issue warrants further study.
General Discussion
In four experiments, we varied participants' perceptual experiences of weight as they studied words and predicted later memory performance via judgments of learning. Consistent with our hypothesis that sensorimotor experiences of weight affect metamemory judgments, greater weight was associated with higher judgments of learning. Weight affected judgments of learning even when weight varied from trial to trial within subjects and even when weight variations were salient and participants were informed that the boxes used to present the words varied in weight. The effects of weight on JOLs depended on relative weights: The weight of the heavy box in Experiment 2 was the same as the weight of the light box in Experiment 3, yet depending on the weight of the other box, it was associated with higher or lower JOLs. Although the weight effect on mean JOLs is small, the effect sizes reported in our experiments ( p 2 from .15 to .25) are comparable to the range of effect sizes obtained by other researchers conducting similar embodiment research (cf. Ackerman et al., 2010; Chandler et al., 2012; Jostmann et al., 2009; Koriat & Nussinson, 2009) . Further, the effects held in item analyses across all experiments.
2
To understand the weight-JOL relationship, we combine the notion that weight is conceptualized as an embodiment of importance (Ackerman et al., 2010; Jostmann et al., 2009 ) and the observation that people view important things as more memorable (cf. Libkuman et al., 2007 ). An alternative interpretation of the weight-JOL relationship is that lifting different weights may have embodied the investment of unequal amounts of mental effort. The relationship between effort and judgments of learning is complex and depends on whether people are goal-driven in their investment of effort, that is, choosing to invest more effort in memorizing some items than others, or are data-driven in their investment of effort, expending more effort and time on items that call for more effort due to intrinsic difficulty (see Koriat et al., 2006; Koriat & Nussinson, 2009 ). When effort is data-driven, items demanding more effort due to intrinsic difficulty receive lower JOLs, but when effort is goal-driven (manipulated by giving higher point values to some items than others), higher valued items that are invested with more effort receive higher JOLs. It is not clear whether participants experienced variations in memorizing effort in the current study as data-driven or goaldriven. In the absence of variations in goals due to different point values, the manipulation of weight across items might have been attributed to data-driven variation in effortful encoding. However, by that account heavier (more effortful) items would lead to lower JOLs rather than the higher JOLs we found across experiments (cf. Koriat & Nussinson, 2009 ). We believe weight as an embodiment of importance represents a better explanation of our overall pattern of results.
The embodied effects of weight were eliminated by explicitly varying the meaning of weight through the priming manipulation ("lightweight is good, heavyweight is bad"). We propose that the priming led to different attributions of the experience of weight such that heavy items were interpreted as bad rather than important. Similarly, the interpretation of embodied cues such as effort or ease of processing is subject to alternative interpretations. Embodied information is used flexibly depending on task goals and depending on what people simulate (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkeilman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005) .
Our word sets were matched across dimensions such as concreteness and frequency, so one might argue that weight was used as a basis for JOLs heuristically in the absence of other cues. 2 We conducted an item analysis for each experiment comparing each word's average JOL from the light versus the heavy condition. We found significant weight effects on JOLs across items in every experiment ( p 2 from .12 to .18) except when we predicted no weight effects in the prime condition of Experiment 4 (F Ͻ 1). However, the particular words within sets varied on dimensions known to affect JOLs, such as valence, and on dimensions known to affect memorability, such as animacy. It is an empirical question whether embodied cues such as weight operate heuristically only in the absence of other cues or whether richer knowledge actually provides a platform for the embodied effects. For example, Chandler et al. (2012) found that a concealed weight increased judged importance of a book, but only for participants with some knowledge of the book. Aside from the marginally significant result in Experiment 4, we consistently failed to see an effect of weight on memory performance, but these experiments do not rule out such an effect. We think it likely that people attend more to heavy objects when lifting and holding them, and greater attention would translate into better memory for heavy objects. Such effects may exist with more extreme manipulations of weight than in the current experiments.
Metacognition is central to human consciousness, yet one might think that metacognition is so abstract as to be free from embodied cognitive effects. It is, after all, thinking about cognitive processes, whereas cognitive processes are tightly linked to representations of perceptions and actions. Our results, along with those of Koriat and Nussinson (2009) , show that at least some of the cues used to make metacognitive judgments such as judgments of learning are embodied. In that our results carry embodied effects into metacognitive judgments, we offer a response to Glenberg's (2010) call to more closely consider the links between mental processes and bodily interactions with the physical world. Additional manipulations inspired by embodied cognition perspectives may provide a fruitful means of increasing our understanding of the relationship between perceptual states and metacognitive judgments.
